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Casenotes

Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet: A Missed
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to
Clarify Establishment Clause Analysis

The village of Kiryas Joel in Orange County, New York is populated
entirely by practitioners of Satmar Hasidim, a strict form of Judaism.1
The Satmar Hasidics, incorporated the village in 1977, and the
boundaries included only the 320 acres owned and inhabited by Satmar
Hasidics.2 Two private, gender-segregated religious schools provided the
education for most of the village's children? However, these schools
were not able to offer special services to handicapped children 4 who are
entitled under state and federal law to special education services even

1. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2484
(1994). The Satmar Hasidic believe they are "required by divine command to live as their
Jewish ancestors did centuries ago." Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2, 114 S. Ct. 2481. Their
practices include: interpreting the Torah strictly, segregating the sexes outside the home,
speaking Yiddish as their primary language, foregoing television and radio, and dressing
in a distinctly religious manner. 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
2. Id. at 2485.
3. Id.
4. Id. These handicapped children included the deaf, the mentally retarded, and others
suffering from a range of physical, mental, or emotional disorders.
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when enrolled in private schools.' Thus, in 1984 the Monroe-Woodbury
Central School District began providing special services for the
handicapped children of Kiryas Joel at an annex to one of the private,
religious schools.8 Monroe-Woodbury ended this arrangement one year
later, however, in response to two United States Supreme Court
decisions.7 The handicapped children were thus forced to attend public
schools outside the village to receive special education services. Parents
of most of these children withdrew them from the public schools because
of the "panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their
own community and being with people whose ways were so different."8
By 1989, only one child from Kiryas Joel was attending public schools;
the other handicapped children either received privately funded services
or went without.9 In the wake of this problem, the New York Legislature passed a statute creating a separate school district for the village
of Kiryas Joel.1" The Kiryas Joel Village School District operated only
a special education program for handicapped children. The other
children stayed in their respective parochial schools, relying on the new
school district for transportation, remedial education, and health and
welfare services." In response to the enactment of Chapter 748, Louis
Grumet and others brought an action against the State Education
Department and various state officials challenging the statute as an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. 2 The State Supreme Court
for Albany County allowed the Kiryas Joel Village School District and
Monroe-Woodbury to intervene as party defendants and accepted the

5. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988 & Supp. IV);
N.Y. EDUC. LAW art. 89 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994).
6. Id.
7. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985) (companion cases holding that federal funds used to pay salaries of
public school teachers who provided remedial services to parochial schools violated the
Establishment Clause).
8. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 114 S. Ct. at 2485 (citing Board of
Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Central Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 180-81,527 N.E.2d
767, 770 (1988)).
9. 114 S.Ct. at 2486.
10. 1989 N.Y. LAws ch. 748. The statute provides in part: "The territory of the village
of Kiryas Joel ... shall be and hereby is constituted a separate school district... and shall
have and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district under the
provisions of the education law." Id. at § 1.
11. 114 S. Ct. at 2486. In fact, the school district served several of the neighboring
districts' handicapped Hasidic children as well. In all, the new district served just over
forty full-time students, and two or three times that many parochial school students on a
part-time basis. Id.
12. Id.
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parties' stipulation discontinuing the action against the original state
defendants. 3 On summary judgment, the trial court ruled for the
plaintiffs, finding that the statute failed all three prongs of the Lemon
Test, 4 and was thus unconstitutional.1 A divided New York Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional because it had the primary effect of advancing religion.' The state
court of appeals affirmed. 7 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari,"8 and affirmed the lower court, holding that because
the statute was "tantamount to an allocation of political power on a
religious criterion and neither presupposes nor requires governmental
impartiality toward religion", it violated the prohibition on establishment.'9
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, in part, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."2 In Reynolds v. United States,2'
the Supreme Court interpreted the Establishment Clause as creating "a
wall of separation between Church and State.2 2 Likewise, in Everson
v. Board of Education of Ewing Township 23 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the idea that the Establishment Clause built a "wall of
separation." However, this rigid "wall of separation" standard proved to
.be an unworkable test in light of the inevitable relationship between
government and religion.24 Thus, in Lemon v. Kurtzman2 5 the Supreme Court finally recognized that "the line of separation, far from
being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of a particular relationship."26 In Lemon, the

13.
14.

Id. at 2487.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

15.

114 S. Ct. at 2487.

16. 187 A.D.2d 16, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1992).
17. 81 N.Y.2d 518, 618 N.E.2d 94 (1993).
18. Board of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
19. Id. at 2484.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. 1, amend. XIV.

21. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
22. Id. at 164. Justice Waite plucked these words from a letter by Thomas Jefferson.
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court also stressed the principle that the Establishment
Clause forbids not only state practices that "aid one religion... or prefer one religion over
another," but also those that "aid all religions." Id. at 15.
24. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that a New York
statute exempting from real property tax realty owned by religious associations and used
exclusively for religious purposes did not violate the Establishment Clause).
25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. I& at 614.

1192

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Court instituted a three-pronged test that vowed to add clarity and
stability to Establishment Clause issues. Under the Lemon test, a
governmental action must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a
principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Rather than providing clarity and stability to Establishment
Clause analysis, the Lemon test has added only confusion and uncertainty in its use. 28 For example, in Larson v. Valente29 the Supreme Court
held that a Minnesota statute requiring registration and disclosure only
of those religious organizations that solicited more than fifty percent of
their funds from nonmembers violated the Establishment Clause.3 °
The Court did not rely on the Lemon test to invalidate the statute, but
rather applied strict scrutiny and the principle that government cannot
prefer one religious organization over another."1 Alternatively, the
Supreme Court in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.3 2 relied exclusively on
the Lemon test to hold that a Massachusetts statute, which vested in the
governing bodies of churches the power to effectively veto applications
for liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of churches, violated the
Establishment Clause.33 Thus, the Court implicates the Lemon test
only in some situations. In others, the Court will effectively ignore
Lemon, and harken back to the principles of separation of church and
state, and strict government neutrality towards religion.34 A comparison of two recent cases, Aguilar v. Felton 5 and Lee v. Weisman,36
provides a model illustration of this trend. In Aguilar,the Court's harsh
adherence to the Lemon test struck down a New York City program that
used federal funds to pay salaries of public school teachers who provided
much needed remedial services to parochial schools. 7 By contrast, the

27. Id. at 612-13.
28. See Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Is Lemon A Lemon? Crosscurrents In Contemporary
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129 (1990).

29.
30.
31.
of the

456 U.S. 228 (1982).
Id. at 255.
Id. at 246.47. The Court did add that the statute probably violated the third prong
Lemon test, the prohibition on excessive entanglement. Id. at 252.

32. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).

33. Id. The Court found that the statute not only had the primary and principal effect
of advancing religion, but also fostered an excessive government entanglement with
religion. Id. at 126.
34. See Everson, supra note 23.
35. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).

36. 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992).
37. 473 U.S. at 414. The Court found that despite New York City's extensive
supervision to ensure religious neutrality, the program nevertheless violated the second
and third prongs of the Lemon test. Id. Also, this decision and its companion case, School
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Court in Lee not only declined to reconsider Lemon, 8 but also did not
even cite Lemon as authority in holding prayers at public school
graduation ceremonies unconstitutional. 9 Rather, the Court resolved
the Establishment Clause issue on the ground that government is
forbidden to sponsor or direct a religious exercise in a public school.4"
Therefore, when Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District4" confronted the Court, constitutional scholars eagerly hoped
the Justices would either re-establish the Lemon test or formulate a new
paradigm for Establishment Clause analysis.42
The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, held the New York
statute, Chapter 748, which created a school district for the Village of
Kiryas Joel, unconstitutional. 3 In reaching its decision, however, the
Court, refused to clarify its analysis for future Establishment Clause
issues. The filing of four concurring opinions, each stressing a different
approach to interpret the Establishment Clause," highlighted the
unclear status of this analysis. In Justice Souter's plurality opinion, the
Court focused on the character of the group vested with governmental
authority.4 5 Pointing to the drawing of village lines to exclude all but
Satmar Hasidics, the Court explained that the village is "defined by its
character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context."4
Even though Chapter 748 did not delegate governmental power
expressly to the religious beliefs of the Satmar Hasidic community, the
Court found that because of the group's character "Chapter 748
effectively identifies these recipients of governmental authority by
reference to doctrinal adherence."47 Thus, the Court concluded that
Chapter 748 was "substantially equivalent to defining a political
subdivision and hence the qualification for its franchise by a religious

Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), are the two cases that dismantled
Monroe-Woodbury's accommodation of the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel prior to the
passage of Chapter 748. See supra note 7.
38. 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
42. Marcia Coyle, Drawing a New Line on Religion? Justices Consider Whether A
Jewish Sect's School DistrictPasses Muster, NATL L.J., Apr. 25, 1994, at 1.
43. 114 S. Ct. at 2487.

44. Id. at 2481. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed a
concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg. Justice O'Connor filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Kennedy filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment only. Id.

45. Id. at 2489.
46. Id. at 2487.
47. Id. at 2489.
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test, resulting in a purposeful and forbidden fusion of governmental and
In this part of its analysis, the Court has
religious functions."' s
essentially invoked the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion echoed this idea by strongly emphasizing
that the decision did not represent a departure from Lemon.49 Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion stated, however, that "the Court's opinion
does not focus on the Establishment Clause test we set forth in
Lemon. " '° Moreover, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion did not even
mention Lemon; instead, it found the statute unconstitutional because
the government intentionally drew political boundaries based on a
particular religious faith."' Also, Justice Kennedy stated that the
decisions in Grand Rapids' and Aguilar," both resolved on strict
applications of the Lemon test, "may have been erroneous."54 The
uncertainty surrounding the viability of Lemon thus remains, as even
the Justices themselves cannot agree on its application. Another chief
concern of the Court was that the legislature failed "to exercise
governmental authority in a religiously neutral way."5 The Court
stressed the general principle that civil authority must be employed in
a manner neutral to religion.5 By selecting the Kiryas Joel community, and hence the Satmar Hasidic religion, for special treatment, the
legislature practiced religious favoritism with no guarantee that other
similarly situated groups would be treated equally.5 7 The Court
concluded that the legislature failed to uphold the constitutional
mandate that "neutrality as among religions must be honored."" Thus,
the Court also relied on pre-Lemon principles of neutrality and
separation to find the statute unconstitutional." Justice Stevens'

48.

Id. at 2490 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 126).

49. 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asserted that the
decision based its conclusion on the second and third prongs of the Lemon test; the
principal or primary effect prong and the entanglement prong. Id.
50. 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stressed that
Establishment Clause analysis would be better served if it was "freed from the Lemon

test's rigid influence." Id. at 2500. She advocated an analysis that would be sensitive to
the particular context of each case resulting in "more opportunity to pay attention to the
specific nuances of each area." Id.
51.

114 U.S. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

52. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
53. Id.
54.
55.

114 U.S. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2491.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2493.
See Everson, supra note 23.
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concurring opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Justice Ginsburg,
expanded these principles by stressing the unconstitutionality of the
statute's affirmative support for a religious sect's segregation. 60 In
holding the statute impermissibly delegated governmental authority to
a group defined by its character as a religious community, the Court not
only relied on principles of Lemon,"' but also stressed the preeminent
mandate of governmental neutrality towards religion.6 2
In choosing to use both Lemon and strict neutrality principles, the
Court rejected any notion that it might formulate a new analysis for
Establishment Clause issues." Thus, the decision will be remembered
for what it did not do, rather than for what it did. The Court passed on
an opportunity to clarify the determinative principles for deciding
Establishment Clause cases. Instead, the Court placed Establishment
Clause analysis into a lottery, where not even the Justices themselves
know which principles to apply. Moreover, the decision sends a warning
signal to state legislatures seeking to accommodate religion. The Court
stated that "the Constitution allows the state to accommodate religious
needs by alleviating special burdens,' but the minefield of principles
a statute now must avoid to be upheld suggests that religious accommodation will only be tolerated in the rarest of circumstances. As Justice
Kennedy's criticism of Aguilar intimated, however, there may be a
window of opportunity for religious accommodation that was formerly
The Court now appears to have five Justices willing to
closed.6
overturn Aguilar and allow the type of accommodation that was present
in the New York City program which paid public school teachers to
Therein lies the
provide remedial services at parochial schools.6
67
paradox of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District.
The Supreme Court, as it now stands, seems amenable to validating a
previously unconstitutional religious accommodation that resulted in the
creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District. This paradox lends

60.

114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).

61. Id. at 2488.
62. Id. at 2491.
63. See Daniel Wise, Religious School DistrictHeld Unlawful: Splintered High Court
Affirms 1993 Ruling By State Court OfAppeals, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1994, at 1.
64. 114 S. Ct. at 2492.
65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402. The dissenters in Aguilar still present on the Court
are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. By their dissents in Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., Justices Scalia and Thomas would also appear willing to join
Justice Kennedy in overturning a decision such as Aguilar. 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
67. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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further support to a need for clarification of Establishment Clause
analysis. As religious issues continue to be at the forefront of American
controversies, the Court will again face religion cases and a stable
approach is required. Ironically, the Court could revisit these very same
parties in the coming years. Just nine days after the Court struck down
the statute creating the Kiryas Joel School District, the New York
Legislature passed Chapter 24168 which allows any municipality
meeting certain population, enrollment, and property wealth criteria to
form a school district. Not surprisingly, Kiryas Joel is the only
municipality in the state that meets the criteria.69 Louis Grumet has,
once again, joined in an action to have the new statute ruled unconstitutional.7" Therefore, the Court may well have to redetermine whether
the Kiryas Joel School District violates its myriad of Establishment
Clause principles. Hopefully, the Justices will not pass on the next
opportunity to add clarity and stability to Establishment Clause
analysis.
JOHN KEVIN MOORE

68. 1994 N.Y. LAW ch. 241 (McKinney 1994).
69. Gary Spencer, Judge Declines to Bar School DistrictLaw: New Kiryas Joel Statute
Called Constitutional,N.Y.J.L., AUG. 11, 1994, at 1.
70. Id.

